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Abstract 
This paper uses Hong Kong stock market’s four sub-indices to examine the existence 
and causes of rational expectation bubbles. The unit root test is applied to the rational 
bubble hypothesis. Various causality test methods are used to examine the causality of 
bubble among the four sub-indices. The empirical results show that in the sub-periods 
of 1986-2002 and 2000-2012, the bubbles of Commerce & Industry and Utilities 
industries are consistent with rational expectation bubbles, but not so in the Finance and 
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I Introduction 
 Stock market bubble is often defined as the deviation between the stock market 
price and the fundamental price. The theory of rational expectation bubble in Blanchard 
and Watson (1982) argued that the movement of stock prices is based on rational 
expectation, and stock bubbles are characterized by a continuous growth in asset prices 
caused by opportunistic purchases aimed at securing future capital gains. The theory has 
aroused interesting debates. For example, Tirole (1982, 1985) showed that stock market 
speculation relied on “inconsistency plans”. Campbell and Shiller (1987) and Lim and 
Phoon (1991) showed that stock bubbles are consistent with rational expectation when 
stock prices and dividends are not cointegrated. By using the Bhargava test to check the 
robustness of results, Diba and Grossman (1988) concluded that stock prices and 
dividends are cointegrated, but argued that stock bubbles reflected a situation of 
self-confirming divergence of stock prices from market fundamentals in response to 
extraneous circumstances. Koustas and Serletis (2005) and Cunado et al. (2005) used a 
fractional integration analysis, while Ye et al. (2011) applied a nonparametric rank test 
for cointegration on the NYSE or S&P Composite Index.  
 For a number of reasons, the Hong Kong’s stock market offers an interesting 
case for the study of stock price. As the third largest world financial center and the 
freest economy, Hong Kong’s political sovereignty was reverted back to the People’s 
Republic of China in July 1997 after being a British colony since the end of the Opium 
War in 1842. Under the constitution described by the Basic Law, Hong Kong becomes a 
Special Administrative Region that maintains a capitalist system for 50 years under the 
“one country, two systems” framework. The Hong Kong economy has achieved an 
advanced status and has been aiding China’s economic reform since 1978. In view of 
the fact that Hong Kong is a relatively small economy with a quite advanced stock 
market while China is the largest developing economy with a fast growing but less 
sophisticated equity market, studies have concentrated on Hong Kong’s financial sector 
in relation in the growing China economy (Li, 2006, 2012; Schenk, 2009; He et al. 2006, 
2009; Leung and Unteroberdoerster, 2008). 
 Nartea and Wu (2013) pointed that the standard deviation of daily stock market 
returns in Hong Kong is much higher than that in US in their study from 1992 to 2002. 
Institutional investors have a weaker role in Hong Kong when compared to the US 
stock market. Nartea and Wu (2013) also found little support for an idiosyncratic 
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volatility effect, but other studies pointed to an increasing trend in return idiosyncratic 
volatility and a ‘puzzling’ negative relationship between idiosyncratic and total 
volatility and stock returns. In recent years as shown in Sun et al.(2013), there is a 
growing number and concentration of mainland Chinese stocks listed on the Hong Kong 
stock market in the form of H-share and ‘‘Red Chips’’ (refer as ‘‘China listing’’ 
hereafter). The increasing presence of mainland Chinese stocks in Hong Kong increases 
the size, trading volume, and its link with the China and world markets but reduces the 
overall volatility of the Hong Kong stock market. 
 One can argue that the Hong Kong stock market fulfilled the conditions in 
Blanchard and Watson (1982) that rational expectation would occur as a result of 
unrestricted personal expectation and opportunistic purchases. By using the Hong Kong 
Hang Seng Index and the US stock market indexes, Lin and Sornette (2013) 
demonstrated the feasibility of advance bubble warning to be followed by crashes or 
extended market downturns. Ahmed et al. (2010) have examined daily returns of stock 
markets in emerging markets including Hong Kong for the absence of nonlinear 
speculative bubbles. Lehkonen (2010) used the duration test to study Hong Kong’s 
Hang Seng Index and concluded the absence of rational expectation bubbles.  
 Most empirical studies on stock markets are based on the general composite 
index rather than sub-indices that can provide a high data frequency and show the 
special characteristics of different industrial and business sectors. In Hong Kong, the 
financial sector sub-indices would be volatile and could subject to rational expectation 
bubble. In the years before and after the hand-over in 1997, for example, Hong Kong 
has suffered a number of financial crises that have resulted in economic and financial 
bubbles. Furthermore, the sub-indices on utilities would show a stable performance as 
utilities consist of non-tradable industries that often served as shelters or “safe havens” 
in times of financial crises. The manufacturing sector in Hong Kong that once occupied 
about 30% of GDP in the early 1980s has declined to less than 10% as manufacturing 
industries have migrated to mainland China (Li, 2012). Such a transition would have 
reflected in the performance of the industrial sub-indices. 
 With the use of sub-indices, one can examine whether the performance of 
particular industries with large increase in their stock price would produce rational 
expectation bubbles for other industries. It would be useful to test whether the stock 
price performance of one particular industry could result in the rational expectation 
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bubble of another industry. In Hong Kong, the composite Hang Seng Index is divided 
into four sub-indices of on Utilities, Finance, Properties, and Commerce and Industry. 
Using these data and the methodology in Campbell and Shiller (1987), this paper first 
applies the ADF and KPSS tests to examine the existence of rational expectation bubble 
in Hong Kong’s stock market. This is followed by the use of causality tests in the four 
sub-indices. In addition, we hope to provide explanations to the empirical results, as the 
four sub-indices would have performed differently.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the theory, methodology and 
the proposition. Section III gives an overview on the statistical performance of the Hong 
Kong stock market. The various causality tests on rational expectation bubbles are 
conducted in Section IV, while the last section concludes the paper. The measurement 
in the difference between the bubble price and the fundamental price in the stock market 
based on the study in Miyakoshi et al. (2007) is shown in the Appendix.  
 
II Theoretical Model and Methodology 
 The definition of rational expectation bubble in Blanchard and Watson (1982) 
is based on the simple efficient market (no-arbitrage) condition that the expected present 
value of a stock price at period t is: 
(1) 1 1
1( 1)
t t
t t
t
p dp E
r
+ +
+
 +
=  + 
,  
where 1 1,t td r+ +  and [ ]tE   denote, respectively, the dividend, the discount factor (or 
stock return) at period t+1 and the expectation conditional on the information set at 
period t. By calculating the forward infinite periods in Equation (1), the reduced form 
becomes: 
(2) 
1 1 1
lim
( 1) ( 1)
t j t j
t t tj jjj i t i i t i
d p
p E E
r r
∞
+ +
→∞
= = + = +
   
= +   ∏ + ∏ +  
∑ .  
Thus, the stock price, tp , in Equation (2) consists of the fundamental value tF , which 
is defined by the first term in the right hand side, and a bubble price, tb , which is 
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defined by the market price minus the fundamental price, t tp F− :  
(3) 
1
lim
( 1)
t j
t t jj
i t i
p
b E
r
+
→∞
= +
 
≡  ∏ + 
.  
Since the price, tb , is based on a rational expectation behavior, it is called a rational 
expectation bubble. Thus, Equation (2) consists of the fundamental value, tF , and a 
rational expectation bubble, tb : 
(4) t t tp F b= + .        
 To see how a rational expectation bubble occurs, we insert Equation (4) into 
Equation (3) and considering a finite 1t jF + + , the first term in the middle becomes zero: 
(5) 
1 1
lim lim
( 1) ( 1)
t j t j t j
t t tj jj j
i t i i t i
F b b
b E E
r r
+ + +
→∞ →∞
= + = +
+   
= =   ∏ + ∏ +   
.       
The tb  on the right hand side of Equation (5) is the solution to a homogeneous 
expectation difference equation, given the extraneous price, 1tb + . Then, through an 
iteration process, we have:  
(6) 1 21 1
1 2 1
/( 1) .... lim
1 1 ( 1)
t jt t
t t t t t t jj
t t i t i
bb bb E E E r E
r r r
++ +
+ + →∞
+ + = +
      
= = + = =      + + ∏ +      
.  
Thus, as far as people continue to rational expect that the extraneous price, t jb + , over a 
fundamental price rises (for example, at the rate of ( 1)t jr + + ), the bubble becomes: 
(7) 
1
lim 0
( 1)
t j
t t jj
i t i
p
b E
r
+
→∞
= +
 
= > ∏ + 
.  
  Campbell and Shiller (1989) suggested a log linear approximation of Equation 
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(1), shown as: 
(8) 1 1 1log(1 ) log( ) log( )t t t tr p d p+ + ++ = + − .  
We approximate the left hand side as 1tr +  and the right hand side as: 
(9) 1 1 1(1 )t t t tr p d pα λ λ+ + +≈ + + − −  ,  
where the tilde letters represent the natural logarithm of a variable, and α and 0 < λ < 1 
are parameters.1 Equation (9) is a linear difference equation for the log stock price. 
Solving forward and imposing the no rational bubble terminal condition, we have: 
(10) lim 0j t jj pλ +→∞ = ,  
and obtain: 
(11) 
0
[(1 ) ]
1
j
t t j t jj
p d rα λ λ
λ
∞
+ +=
= + − −
− ∑
 .   
Finally, taking the mathematical expectation of Equation (11) based on the information 
available at time t and rearranging in terms of the log dividend–price ratio yields: 
(12) 
0
[ ]
1
j
t t t t j t jj
d p E d rα λ
λ
∞
+ +=
 − = − + −∆ + − ∑
  . 
 Campbell and Shiller (1989) have derived the necessary condition for 
non-rational expectation bubble that the log dividend and log stock price have 
cointegrating vector restricted to (1, -1), namely, the log dividend yield, t td p−  , is 
stationary, if rational expectation bubbles do not exist. Craine (1993) pointed out that if 
the dividend growth factor, t jd +∆   and the stock returns, t jr + , are stationary stochastic 
processes, then the log dividend yield, t td p−  , is a stationary stochastic process under 
the no rational bubble restriction. On the contrary, the presence of a unit root in the log 
dividend yield is consistent with rational expectation bubble in stock prices. Taking 
contraposition from the Campbell and Shiller (1989) proposition, we can derive the 
1 Note that for the discount factor, 1tr + , Campbell and Shiller (1989, p. 203) used the 
rate of treasury bill, commercial paper and stock index return. The stock index return is 
used here.  
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sufficient condition for the rational expectation bubbles as follows. 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose that the dividend growth factor, td∆   and the stock returns, tr , 
are stationary stochastic processes, rational expectation bubbles exist if the log 
dividend yield, t td p−  is not stationary. 
 
III Data and Performance in Hong Kong’s Stock Price 
 The monthly data of Hang Seng Index (HSI) and the four sub-indices (Finance, 
Properties, Utilities, and Commerce & Industry) are compiled from Datastream for the 
period from 1986:01 to 2012:08. Figure 1 plots the logged market prices and the 
fundamental prices of the four sub-indices. The computation method for the 
fundamental price is described in Appendix. As Figure 1 shows, Hong Kong’s 
composite HSI exhibits a number of setbacks during the sample period. Firstly, the fall 
in 1989 was probably due to the June 4th Tiananmen incident in Beijing, and economic 
pessimism persisted until recovery in 1992 after the late Deng Xiaoping reasserted 
economic reform in his spring visit to Shenzhen. The setback in 1995 was short-lived 
and responded to the ultra-rapid rise in income and wealth prior to the 1997 sovereignty 
change.  
 The Hong Kong economy recessed for a couple of years in the mid-1980s 
during the Sino-British negotiation over the post-1997 political future of Hong Kong. 
By late 1980s, the economy recovered and began to experience overheating in the early 
1990s, as inflow of hot money took advantage of the 1997 sovereignty reversion and 
widespread speculation in stocks and property emerged. In the meantime, the low cost 
provision in the China economy had gradually attracted industrial investments from 
Hong Kong, and manufacturing began to migrate, leading to a fall in manufacturing 
output and domestic export.  
 However, after the burst of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, the 
prolonged economic recession reflected the shrinking industrial structure as Hong 
Kong’s industrial capacity and economy was too weak to sustain the collapsing stock 
market. While the Asian financial crisis was more of a regional crisis, the dotcom 
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bubble in 2000-2001 was global and had imposed another setback to the stock market in 
Hong Kong. Although the stock market recovered by 2001, the outbreak of the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) led to another downfall in 2003-2004. While the 
Hong Kong economy stabilized by 2005, the U.S. financial crisis in 2008 was another 
crisis that led to a sharp fall of the stock price. Li (2013) concluded that the first decade 
of the Hong Kong economy after sovereignty change in 1997 has suffered from periodic 
crises, economic recession and a young government. 
 Besides exogenous shocks, there were also institutional changes in the Hong 
Kong stock market itself and the impact of listing deregulation in mainland China that 
affected the Hong Kong market from 1986-2012. Sun et al (2013, p. 2230) pointed out: 
the so-called ‘‘through-train program’’ suggested by the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) in August 2007 under which mainland individuals are 
allowed to buy Hong Kong stocks directly. The announcement brought the Hang Seng 
China Enterprises Index, which represented the H-shares, up by 68.8% and the HSI up 
by 60% in 3 months even though the subprime mortgage crisis began to surface. 
However, the program was shelved by Premier Wen Jiabao when he expressed his 
worries on the program in November 2007. Subsequently, the HSI plummeted by 
10,000 points from its record high of 32,000 in October 2007 to 22,000 in January 
2008.2  
 One can see from the four sub-indices that the gaps between the logged market 
price and the logged fundamental price are narrower in both Utilities and Finance 
sub-indices. The Finance sub-index shows a close movement with the composite HSI, 
but despite its volatility, the Finance sub-index tends to have fluctuated less drastically 
than both Properties and Commerce & Industry. The Properties sub-index has shown a 
wide gap between the market price and fundamental price, especially after the early 
1990s, indicating widespread speculation in properties. Indeed, the “short-term 
investment behavior” appeared in the transition years prior to 1997 (Li, 2006, 2012) has 
resulted in speculation. The inflow of “hot money” prior to 1997 had pushed up 
property price severely. The Commerce & Industry sub-index has also shown a big gap 
between the two prices, but it also dropped severely in 1998 during the Asian financial 
2 The program was allowed to proceed in 2012. 
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crisis and in 2003 at the outbreak of SARS. While the commerce sector contains mainly 
business services, their economic performance has been highly vulnerable to economic 
shocks. Manufacturing in Hong Kong has been weakened as many manufacturing 
industries have moved to southern China since the late 1980s when low wages and 
attractive government policies across the border appeared.  
 The monthly Hong Kong data contain both the stock price and dividend yield 
for each of the four categories. The dividend yield data are used as a proxy for 
dividends. The dividend yield for each category is defined as the “total dividend of 
index constituent stocks divided by the index market capitalization”. This is equivalent 
to say that the dividend is divided by stock price index. We can proxy the dividend by 
using the product of “dividend yield” and “stock price index” (Hang Seng Bank, 2012). 
Figure 2 plots the logarithms of the price, dividend, and dividend yield of the four 
sub-indices. The log of the dividend yield is presented on the right hand side of the 
vertical axis. There is no apparent trend in the log of the dividend yield during the 
sample period. For the two sectors of Finance and Properties, they look like mean 
reverting (stationary), but otherwise (non-stationary) for the two sectors of Commerce 
& Industry and Utilities. This supports the fact that the stock prices for the two sectors 
of Commerce & Industry and Utilities are consistent with a rational expectation bubble. 
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Figure 1 Hong Kong’s Monthly Stock Price Indexes 
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 Figure 2 Dividend, Price and Dividend-Yield 
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IV  Statistical Tests for Rational Expectation Bubbles  
 We will test whether the sub-indices are consistent with a rational expectation 
bubble. The sample period is divided into two sub-periods of 1986:1-2002:3 and 
2000:4-2012:8. The first period includes the consequences of the Asian financial crisis, 
which is mainly a regional crisis. The second period covers the situation of the global 
dotcom bubble in 2000 and the US financial in 2008. The two sub-periods thus provide 
analysis on both the regional financial crisis and the two global crises in 2000 and 2008. 
 
IV.1  Tests of the Assumptions 
 The assumptions in Proposition 1 that the dividend growth factor, td∆   and the 
stock returns, tr , are stationary stochastic processes, are confirmed by the test results 
shown in Table 1. Columns 2–4 in Table 1 report the t-statistics for the augmented 
Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test with the null hypothesis of a unit root (Dickey and Fuller, 
1979). The reported t-statistics are based on the regressions with the following 
deterministic components: no deterministic components, τ , a constant only, µτ , and 
a constant and a linear trend, ττ . The procedure for choosing the optimal lag length is 
to test between one-lag and twenty four-lag for the AR, by using the minimum value of 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The residuals from the chosen AR are then 
checked for whiteness.3 If the residuals in any equation proved to be non-white, we 
sequentially chose a higher lag structure until they are whitened. The optimal lag 
lengths are reported in columns 5–7 of Table 1. The ADF test rejects entirely the 
unit-root null hypothesis for the dividend growth td∆   and the market return tr  in the 
assumptions of Proposition 1.  
 
 
3 Following Gonzalo (1994), the whiteness is checked by the Ljung-Box Q tests for 
absence of correlation for all 24 (or 18) lags at 5% significance level. 
12 
 
                                                   
Table 1  Tests of Stationarity for td∆  and tr  
Variable                       ADF  AIC lags  KPSS 
  τ  µτ  ττ            µη  τη  
1986:1-2002:3             
Finance  △dt -1.357  -3.481  -3.451   13  12  12   0.147  0.121  
rt -9.784  -10.131  -10.126   1  1  1   0.075  0.058  
Properties  △dt  -3.993  -4.308  -5.514   5  5  5   1.398  0.049  
rt -8.724  -8.826  -8.937   2  2  2   0.157  0.025  
  Com&Ind  △dt   -2.588  -2.583  -9.064   11  11  4   0.749  0.039  
rt -8.366  -8.400  -8.498   2  2  2   0.179  0.035  
  Utilities  △dt -9.191  -9.653  -9.627   1  1  1   0.035  0.034  
rt -10.55 -11.009  -10.993    1  1  1    0.036  0.029  
2000:4-2012:8           
Finance  △dt     -8.465  -8.540  -8.610   1  1  1   0.169  0.033  
rt -8.053  -8.037  -8.048   1  1  1   0.251  0.034  
Properties  △dt   -9.981  -8.085  -8.101   1  3  3   0.077  0.038  
rt -9.403  -9.381  -9.357   1  1  1   0.053  0.047  
Com&Ind  △dt  -8.465  -8.540  -8.610   1  1  1   0.169  0.033  
rt -8.420  -8.392  -8.509   1  1  1   0.329  0.179  
  Utilities  △dt -7.277  -7.690  -7.269   5  5  8   0.051  0.047  
rt -6.149  -9.142  -9.134   2  1  1   0.062  0.033  
Critical value 0.05 -1.942  -2.881  -3.440            0.463  0.146  
Notes: The null hypothesis in the ADF test is the unit root, while the null hypothesis in 
the KPSS test is stationarity. The numbers in the columns for ADF and KPSS are test 
statistics and the critical values at 5% significance level are shown at the bottom of the 
table. The optimal lag length for AIC lags, are shown respectively for , ,µ ττ τ τ . The 
reported KPSS statistics are based on the same lag-length as those of ADF test. 
 
 
 The Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS) (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) 
argued that unit-root tests often fail to reject a unit root because they have low power 
against relevant alternatives, and proposed that the KPSS test for the null hypothesis of 
stationarity, as this can complement the unit-root tests. The KPSS test statistics, 
reported in columns 8 and 9 of Table 1, cannot reject the null hypotheses of level and 
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trend stationarity. Combining the results of the two tests, we conclude that the 
assumptions are satisfied in Proposition 1, and that the dividend growth factor, td∆   
and the stock returns, tr , are stationary stochastic processes. 
 
Table 2 Tests for Stationarity of Logged Dividend-Yield, t td p−   
Variable                       ADF  AIC lags  KPSS 
  τ  µτ  ττ            µη  τη  
1986:1-2002:3            
Finance 
Properties 
Commerce & Industry 
Utilities 
-0.562  
-0.668  
-1.043  
-0.013  
-3.092  
-3.604  
-2.128  
-2.596  
-3.204  
-3.891  
-3.214  
-2.892  
 1  
4  
4  
1  
1  
1  
10  
1  
1  
1  
10  
1  
 2.719  
1.376  
0.880  
1.575  
0.675  
0.433  
0.180  
0.439  
2000:4-2012:8           
Finance -0.201  -3.398  -3.386   1  3  3   0.127  0.108  
Properties -0.555  -3.259  -3.469   1  1  1   1.246  0.338  
Commerce & Industry -0.139  -2.174  -2.835   6  6  6   1.146  0.228  
Utilities -1.243  -1.604  -3.237   6  1  2   6.104  0.122  
Critical values 0.05 -1.942  -2.881  -3.440       0.463  0.146  
Notes: Same as Table 1. 
 
 
IV.2 Tests for Rational Expectation Bubbles  
  In Table 2, we perform the ADF test and KPSS test against the sufficient 
condition, namely the log dividend yield is not stationary, for existence of rational 
expectation bubbles in Proposition 1. Combining both test results, we conclude that the 
log dividend yield, t td p−  , for the Commerce & Industry and Utilities industries are 
not stationary, supporting the existence of rational expectation bubbles for the Utilities 
and Commerce & Industry sectors in the two sub-periods of 1986:1-2002:3 and 
2000:4-2012:8. However, the two sectors of Finance and Properties are not consistent 
with the rational expectation bubble. The only exception is found in the no deterministic 
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components, τ . However, as seen in Figure 2, there exists obviously deterministic 
components (constant term in the test regression) for the log dividend yield. In spite of 
deterministic components, we have to test for no deterministic components. 
  As argued in Diba and Grossman (1988), a specific sector that experienced a 
large increase in its stock price could induce the expectation for the economy to growth 
further and would produce a rational expectation bubble in other industries. This 
argument can be tested by using the performance of the four sub-indices in the Hong 
Kong stock market to see if there were rational expectation bubbles. In particular, we 
would investigate if the rational expectation bubbles in the two sectors of Utilities and 
Commerce & Industry are caused by either the two growth-leading industries 
(Properties and Finance) in Hong Kong or by the impact from foreign markets. As 
pointed out earlier, the stock price in the Utilities often served as “safe havens”, while 
manufacturing industries in Hong Kong has been shrinking as many industrialists have 
moved their plants across the border to south China beginning from the mid-1980s. 
  We first conduct the causality tests among the stock returns tr  of all 
sub-indices (Sims, 1972, Geweke et al., 1983, Granger, 1969). Considering the unit root 
test results shown in Table 1, we see that the stock returns are stationary, and we can 
then use these tests directly with the ad hoc lag length of 12. For the Sims (1972) test, 
we pre-filter the variables with (1 - 0.75L) and compute a two-sided distributed lag of 
stock return ur  of Utilities (u) on Finance (f), fr , and then test the leads 
0( 6,.. 1)ib i= = − − of Utilities (u):  
(13) 12, , 06 , : 0 ( 6,.. 1);f t i u t i t i f uir a b r H b i r rε
×
−=−
= + + = = − − →∑ ,     
where 2(0, )t Nε σ  is a stochastic term and a is a constant term.  
  To conduct the test in Geweke et al. (1983), we further include the lag of the 
Finance industry in Equation (13): 
(14) 12 12, , , 06 1 , : 0 ( 6,.. 1);f t i u t i i f t i t i f ui ir a b r c r H b i r rε
×
− −=− =
= + + + = = − − →∑ ∑ . 
To conduct the Granger (1969) test, we regress the stock return ur  of Utilities (u) on 
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lags of Finance (f) and Utilities (u):  
(15) 12 12, , , 01 1 , : 0 ( 1,.,12);u t i u t i i f t i t i f ui ir a b r c r H c i r rε
×
− −= =
= + + + = = →∑ ∑ . 
 Table 3 shows all the causality test results in a bivariate model. The figures in 
the columns in Table 3 denote the significance level for the null hypotheses in Equations 
(13)-(15). On the contrary, the significance levels for non-causality are shown from the 
figures in the rows to figures in the columns. For example, in Table 3 (1986:1-2002:3), 
the significance level for non-causality from Finance returns to Properties returns is 
0.311. In the first sub-period (1986-2002) that covered the influence of the Sino-British 
negotiation over the future of Hong Kong in 1982-1984 and the impact of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-1998, the rational expectation stock bubbles were not 
indigenously caused by industries within Hong Kong. However, one can see that the 
stock bubbles in the two sectors of Utilities and Commerce & Industry were caused by 
the impact from other world financial markets and/or the impact from the growing 
world economy. In the second sub-period (2000-2012) that covered the influence of the 
dotcom bubble in 2000 and the US crisis in 2008, the rational expectation bubble of the 
Utilities was caused by the other domestic industries that contributed to Hong Kong’s 
economic growth. However, the rational expectation bubble of the Commerce & 
Industry was not caused by the impact from other domestic industries, but was caused 
by impact from the growing world economy. 
 
IV.3 Robustness Checks  
  We check the robustness of the results in Table 3 by using the multivariate 
generalization of Granger causality in the framework of VAR model. We chose the 6 
lag-length for each variable which equals to the total lagged variables in Equation (15).   
(16) 
6
, , , , ,1
0 ,
: [ ]; ( , , , ) ; (0, )
. : 0 ( 1,.,6);
t i t i t i hk i t f t p t u t c t ti
fu i f u
Y a C Y C c Y r r r r N
Eg H c i r r
ε ε−=
×
′= + + = = Σ
= = →
∑ 
  
Table 4 shows the results of causality. Most of the results support the robustness, except 
for the Utilities in the second sub-period (2000-2012). We thus have to suspend the 
result for the Utilities industry.   
 
16 
 
 
Table 3 Stock Returns Exogeneity 
Sims 1986:1-2002:3 2000:4-2012:8 
→ Fin Pro Uti C&I Fin Pro Uti C&I 
Finance   0.311  0.460  0.118    0.085  0.027  0.233  
Properties 0.342    0.786  0.061  0.003    0.006  0.024  
Utilities 0.046  0.213    0.038  0.691  0.836    0.556  
Com&Ind 0.446  0.068  0.330    0.156  0.001  0.003    
GMD 1986:1-2002:3 2000:4-2012:8 
→ Fin Pro Uti C&I Fin Pro Uti C&I 
Finance   0.438  0.554  0.185    0.140  0.000  0.073  
Properties 0.404    0.804  0.118  0.023    0.000  0.006  
Utilities 0.078  0.311    0.104  0.556  0.602    0.164  
Com&Ind 0.566  0.042  0.154    0.200  0.000  0.013    
Granger 1986:1-2002:3 2000:4-2012:8 
→ Fin Pro Uti C&I Fin Pro Uti C&I 
Finance   0.706  0.147  0.353    0.050  0.002  0.218  
Properties 0.850    0.392  0.106  0.029    0.010  0.153  
Utilities 0.244  0.251    0.115  0.102  0.033    0.088  
Com&Ind 0.913  0.170  0.148    0.078  0.003  0.024    
Notes: The figures in the columns denote the significance level of the null hypotheses in 
Equations (13)-(15). The significance level for non-causality for variables can be read 
from the rows to the columns. Geweke et al. (1983)’s test is denoted as GMD. 
 
 
Table 4 Multivariate Generalization of the Granger Causality 
Granger 1986:1-2002:3 2000:4-2012:8 
→ Fin Pro Uti C&I Fin Pro Uti C&I 
Finance   0.458  0.316  0.243    0.461  0.944  0.155  
Properties 0.220    0.581  0.321  0.096    0.250  0.010  
Utilities 0.013  0.033    0.051  0.488  0.141    0.109  
Com&Ind 0.200  0.004  0.422    0.937  0.040  0.836    
Note: The figures in the columns denote the significance level of the null hypotheses.  
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IV.4 Discussion on Real Estate Bubble and Externally-imposed Monetary Policy 
 Is there any relationship between stock market bubbles and bubbles in other 
assets, particularly real estate prices? The movement of the Properties and other 
sub-indices seem to closely track the returns from outright ownership of property. On 
the other hand, what role does the exchange rate regime play in the emergence of 
bubbles? Hong Kong has a currency board arrangement that prevents the interest rate 
diverging from the US rate. This limits pre-emptive action, and bubbles seem to arise 
when US monetary policy is particularly loose.  
 We use a 5-dimensional VAR model to examine the relationship between stock 
price bubble, real estate bubble and the US interest rate. The US call money rate data 
come from the OECD Database, while the Hong Kong real estate price data come from 
Rating and Valuation Department, Hong Kong SAR.4 As shown in Table 4, we chose 
the 4 lag-length for the five variables including monthly real estate price return, ,r tr , and 
incorporate one exogenous variable of the first difference of the logged US monthly call 
rate, tϕ .
5  We chose the 4 lag-length for each variable which equals to the total lagged 
variables in Equation (15).   
(17) 
4 4
1 1
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
0 ,
: ~ (0, )
( , , , , ) , [ ], ,
( , , , , )
. : 0 ( 1,., 4);
t i t i i t i t ti i
t f t p t u t c t r t i hk
i f i p i u i c i r i
f u i f u
Y a C Y Id N
where Y r r r r r C c I identity matrix
and d d d d d d
Eg H c i r r
ϕ ε ε− −= =
×
= + + + Σ
′= = =
=
= = →
∑ ∑
  
 
We introduce an exogenous variable of tϕ for system (17). Then, we have to test 
whether tϕ  affect the variable tY , i.e., whether we should introduce the US monthly 
call rate into system (17). By using the Likelihood Ratio, we test the null hypothesis of 
no effects on system (17) by the US monthly call rate. In Table 5, we can find the 
4 The real estate price includes monthly, quarterly and annual data. But the monthly 
data starts from 1993M1. Then, we got the monthly data from 1986M1 to 1992M12 by 
using linear interpolation on quarterly data. 
5 We have implemented an ADF test for the first difference of the logged US monthly 
of the call rate and for the first difference of the logged real estate price as well as in 
Table 1. The results are that all are stationary for both periods. However, the level US 
call rates have unit roots for both periods even by using ADF test without constant term 
and trend, with constant term, with constant term and trend.  
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significance level for null hypothesis, 0.077 for the first period and 0.89 for the second 
period. Thus, we need not to introduce the US monthly call into system (17). Without 
the US call, our estimate shown in Table 5 confirm that the results in Table 4 are robust; 
that is, the rational expectation bubble of the Commerce & Industry and the Utilities in 
both sub-periods was not caused by the impact from other domestic industries, but was 
caused by impact from the growing world economy. 
 In short, the Hong Kong stock market presents an ideal setting for the 
investigation on the rational expectation bubble. On the other hand, Hong Kong has a 
currency board arrangement that prevents the interest rate diverging from the US rate, 
though this policy imposed no significant impact in our results. Moreover, the Hong 
Kong has shortage of land, and returns from outright ownership of property attracted 
investors. However, the real estate bubbles have no effects on the other bubbles in the 
two sub-periods, as shown in Table 5. Rather, the impact of the real estate bubble came 
from the bubbles occurred in other industries, especially in the first sub-period. 
 
 
Table 5 Multivariate Generalization of the Granger Causality with Real Estate 
Granger 1986:1-2002:3 2000:4-2012:8 
→ Fin Pro Uti C&I Real Fin Pro Uti C&I Real 
Finance  0.329 0.658 0.171 0.037  0.342 0.823 0.269 0.639 
Properties 0.220  0.518 0.209 0.013 0.093  0.357 0.015 0.092 
Utilities 0.012 0.017  0.073 0.028 0.565 0.864  0.511 0.041 
Com&Ind 0.331 0.002 0.151  0.002 0.882 0.001 0.945  0.135 
RealE 0.498 0.698 0.267 0.510  0.892 0.476 0.615 0.592  
UScall 29.589 (0.077) 12.677 (0.89) 
Note: The “UScall” means the US call rate, where the figure in the column denote 
Chi-squared ( 2χ ) and the figure in parenthesis is significance level for null hypothesis. 
The “RealE“ means the real estate price’s return. The figures in the columns denote the 
significance level of the null hypotheses of non-causality without the US monthly call 
rate. 
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V Conclusion 
 By using the data from Hong Kong’s four sub-indices, we conducted the unit 
root test on the existence of rational bubble, and in turn the causality of bubble is 
examined by several causality test methods. The first finding is that in the two 
sub-periods of 1986-2002 and 2000-2012, the Commerce & Industry and Utilities 
industries are consistent with rational expectation bubbles, while those of the Finance 
and Properties are not. Secondly, the rational expectation bubble of the Utilities in the 
second sub-period (2000-2012) was caused by the other three industry sectors that 
reflected the growing Hong Kong economy, while that of the Commerce & Industry 
sector was caused by the industries in foreign countries. However, we cannot confirm 
the robustness of the result of Utilities. Rather, when we introduce the real estate price 
bubble (not stock price bubble for real estate industry) into the estimation model, the 
rational expectation bubble of the Commerce & Industry and the Utilities in the two 
sub-periods was not caused by the impact from other domestic industries, but was 
caused by impact from the growing world economy. Thirdly, Hong Kong’s conspicuous 
elements for research phenomena are the real estate bubble and the externally-imposed 
monetary policy (depending on US monetary policy). The latter element did not affect 
our results. The real estate bubble did not affect the bubbles of other industry but were 
affected from the others.  
 These results suggest that studies using sub-indices can show the performance 
of different industries, and that different bubbles can be distinguished so that different 
policies would be needed to deal with the industries. Diba and Grossman (1988) argued 
that rational expectation is caused by the growing foreign economy. Even recent studies 
such Koustas and Serletis (2005), Cunado et al. (2005) and Ye et al. (2011) have not 
derived uniform evidence for rational expectation bubble. However, using sub-indices 
and the Hong Kong market as an ideal setting for the investigation on the rational 
expectation bubble, as in Lam and Tam (2011), Nartea and Wu (2013), 
Lin and Sornette (2013) and Ahmed et al., (2010), we have derived a positive evidence 
for rational expectation bubble.  
 If domestic policies were necessary, Diba and Grossman (1988) proposed to 
implement individual industry policies against the non-rational expectation bubbles. As 
such, these results also supported the needed theories for the study of non-rational 
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expectation bubble in the Hong Kong stock price. For example, Guo and Hung (2010) 
incorporated the inflow of hot money in their analysis, while Wang et al. (2011) 
focused on stronger integration in the global financial market, and Koivu (2012) 
examined the relevance of monetary policy in China’s stock market. As shown in Li and 
Kwok (2009) and Li (2006, 2012), the finance sector in Hong Kong is international and 
that its market movements would have followed that in other world financial centers. 
The “short-term investment behavior” that appeared in Hong Kong’s transition years 
prior to 1997 would have resulted in speculation, and the inflow of “hot money” had 
pushed up property price severely. 
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Appendix:  Measuring Bubble Prices 
 Miyakoshi et al. (2007) proposed the following methodology to measure the 
stock price bubble within the framework of Blanchard and Watson (1982). Suppose that 
people expect at time t the present dividend growth rate tλ  and the discount rate tr
will continue. Then, people expect the dividend grows at a constant rate tλ  from t, 
namely , j (1 )
j
t t td d λ= +  for all period j and for an initial value of td . The fundamental 
value tF  in Equations (2) and (4) is expressed as: 
(A1) 11
0 11 1
(1 ) 1
( 1) (1 )
j
t t tt j
t t tj j
j ji t i t t t
dd
F E d
r r r
λ λ
λ
∞ ∞
+ +
+
= == + −
 + + 
≡ = =     ∏ + + −   
∑ ∑ ,  
where t tr λ>  is assumed. Considering Equation (A1), the growth rate tη  of the 
fundamental value is shown as: 
(A2) 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 11 1 1 1
1 1
t t t t t t t t t
t
t t t t t t t t t
F d r d rwhere
F d r d r
λ λ λ λ
η
λ λ λ λ
− − − −
− − − − −
+ − + −
≡ − = − = − ≈
+ − + −
. 
Then, the growth rate of the fundamental value equals the growth rate of dividend, 
t tη λ= . Given 1tF − , we can compute the fundamental value tF  as: 
(A3) 1 0
0
(1 ) (1 )
t
t t t t j
j
F F or F Fλ λ−
=
= + = +Π .  
The market price for a stock is said to be overvalued (bubbled) if     t tP F> in Equation 
(A3), undervalued if    < t tP F , and normal otherwise.  
 However, 0F  is unknown in practice. Therefore, we use the following method to 
identify the unknown 0F . Suppose 0 0F P=  for a particular month and we compute 
the path of 0 jF −  for some j. When the following condition holds, 
(A4) 0 0 0(1 0.05) (1 0.05)    for some duration of jj j jF P F− − −− ≤ ≤ + ,  
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we define that at period 0, 0 0F P= , and also that the price 0 jP −  is not overvalued nor 
undervalued until period 0. Some duration in Equation (A4) is needed in this definition 
because the market price normally equals to the fundamental price. Then, at least, the 
growth rate of the fundamental value must be roughly equal to that of the market price 
until period 0 from several past periods. When the following condition holds, 
(A5) 0 0(1 0.05) ,t tF P for all t from T to T
∗ ∗∗
+ ++ <   
we define the stock price tP  as being overvalued from T* to T**. The size of the 
bubble is defined as 0 0t tP F+ +− . 
 We depict the figure for the market price, the fundamental prices and the size 
of bubble based on Equations (A4)-(A5). The Hong Kong data in January 1990 showed 
that 0 0F P= , and this satisfied the condition in Equation (A3). We also recognized that 
the price 0 jP −  is neither overvalued nor undervalued for several years before January 
1990. The bubbles in all four sectors can explicitly be seen from February 1990 
onwards, as shown in Figure 1. However, the bubbled prices (the size of bubbles) for 
Utilities and Commerce & Industry continue to go up and down (large and small). That 
is to say, the bubbled prices seemed to react to the rapidly growing economy of Hong 
Kong or the other economies. On the other hand, the bubbled prices for Finance in 
particular and Properties increased rapidly around the time of the dotcom bubble and the 
global financial crisis bubble, but disappeared afterwards.  
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